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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Using the Ethical Principles of Union 
Organizing to Avoid Card-Check Neutrality 
and Corporate Campaigns
T
he current rules and conventions for union organizing for hotel employees seem to invite both 
labor and management to try to game the system in preparation for an election to determine 
whether employees will be represented by a union. The National Labor Relations Board has 
proposed regulations that would expedite the organizing process, based on the logical fallacy 
that the outcome of a process allows one to assess the fairness of that process. Alternatively, labor 
unions push for agreements that prevent employees from having the chance to cast an anonymous vote 
for or against organizing. Instead, the employees would become part of a bargaining unit if a sufficient 
number of cards are received indicating a preference for a union. This agreement is combined with a 
promise of employer neutrality during the process. In place of those agreements, or the current legally 
mandated method, this report proposes adopting a system that is intended to preserve the workers’ 
right to self-determination and to create an even playing field for both labor and management. As 
explained here, the new system would be based on the Principles for Ethical Conduct During Union 
Representational Campaigns, developed by the Institute for Employee Choice, a project of Richard 
Bensinger and Dick Shubert, who wanted to reduce the unfairness to employees found in the current 
organizing system.
by Zev J. Eigen and David Sherwyn
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CORNELL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW REPORT
I
n the summer of 2013, after protracted negotiations, Hyatt Hotels and unite/here reached a 
landmark labor agreement. Of note in this agreement is the commitment by both parties to a 
process that leads to what they term “fair elections” for future labor representation. The concept of 
what represents a “fair agreement” has been a subject of debate, proposed legislation, and litigation 
for decades. In this paper, we explore a different concept of fairness. Rather than allow years of discord 
to limit the parties’ options, the proposal is to have both parties communicate under consistent 
standards, without intimidation and unrest. Our goal in presenting this proposal is to create an 
environment where all parties to a union representation decision have the opportunity to be heard 
fairly and, most critically, the employees are able to choose whether they wish to be represented in a 
free and fair election. That is, those employee groups who wish to be represented have the opportunity 
for collective bargaining, while those who do not want to be organized are not forced into representation.
Using the Ethical Principles of Union Organizing to Avoid 
Card-Check Neutrality and Corporate Campaigns
by Zev J. Eigen and David Sherwyn
4 Cornell Institute for Hospitality Labor and Employment Relations • Cornell University
For hospitality employers concerned about union or-
ganizing, the elections of 2010 and 2012 ended the threat of 
passage of the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) and allowed 
the industry to exhale a collective sigh of relief. This relief, 
however, may not be the end of the story. The National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) is engaged in a rule making process 
to create a streamlined “quick election” process. The board’s 
new procedures would effectively shorten the time between 
filing a petition for an election and the election itself from the 
current median of 38 days to between 10 and 21 days. The 
NLRB’s rulemaking ability, however, did not survive judicial 
review because the board did not have a quorum of members, 
as we explain later in this report. Now that the NLRB is fully 
constituted, the proposed new rules could become reality. The 
quick elections may not, however, be relevant to the hotel 
industry, where the most relevant union, unite here, does 
not seek to organize through elections. Instead, unite here 
uses leverage to convince employers to agree to card-check 
neutrality agreements—a process is that is significantly more 
union friendly than the organizing procedures that would 
have taken effect under EFCA. 
At the heart of the NLRB’s rule making change and the 
unions’ insistence on card-check neutrality are contentions re-
garding fairness in connection with employees’ representation. 
Unions take the position that the current system, which in-
volves an election regarding a bargaining representative, is not 
fair, and they further assert that card-check neutrality is fair. 
This perception is based on the anticipated outcome of the 
two competing approaches. The card-check proposal would 
result in increased union density, as compared with elections.1 
In this report, we discuss and redefine the concept of fairness 
by separating the process from the outcome. We analyze the 
current election-based system, card-check neutrality, and 
quick elections under this new rubric. We then set forth an 
entirely different perspective, based on ethical principles of 
union organizing. We contend that our proposed system is 
more fair than those that are proposed or in use. It will allow 
employees who wish to organize to become union members, 
and it would allow progressive employers to prevail in both a 
union election and in the competition for public approval. 
What Is Fair?
The determination of fairness seems to be heavily weighted 
by the results of a system rather than by an assessment of the 
process that is used. For example, there is substantial litera-
ture comparing the results of employment discrimination cas-
1 For a discussion of card checks and union elections, see: David Sherwyn, 
Zev Eigen, and Paul Wagner, “The Hotel Industry’s Summer of 2006: A 
Watershed Moment for America’s Labor Unions?,” Cornell Hotel and Restau-
rant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4 (November 2006), pp. 337-349.
es resolved in litigation with those resolved in arbitration.2 
One underlying theme of this work is that systems are fair 
if they have comparable results. Alternatively, according 
to some, there is a positive relationship between plaintiff 
victories and fairness.3 Similarly, there are those who point 
to the results of union organizing drives and elections 
and make conclusions about the fairness of the process by 
looking at the results. The system is fair, according to some, 
if the union wins the majority of elections but unfair oth-
erwise. As we discuss below, the results of an adjudication 
system or a union representation election standing alone 
do not reveal anything about the system’s fairness.
The fairness correlation between rules and outcomes 
can only be assessed if we have determinative information 
prior to the time that we invoke the system. In sports, we 
would need to know the abilities of the teams. If the teams 
are of reasonably equal ability, then a fair system would 
result in each team winning about half the games. 
To assess the fairness of a judicial process, we need to 
know the facts on which a holding is based. In discrimi-
nation claims we would need to know if the employer 
violated the law. Thus, if employee plaintiffs who go to trial 
in discrimination cases were in fact discriminated against 
90 percent of the time, a fair system should generate ap-
proximately a 90-percent employee win rate. If plaintiffs 
were discriminated against only 10 percent of the time, 
we should expect to see a 10-percent win rate for those 
employees. With respect to discrimination, because the 
trial determines guilt or innocence, we cannot judge the 
fairness of the system merely by analyzing results. What 
we are describing here is known as the “base rate fallacy.” 
Without information on the reference category’s base rate 
(in this case, how much employers actually discriminate), 
2 See, e.g., Curtis Brown, Cost-Effective, Fast and Fair: What the Em-
pirical Data Indicate About ADR, Metro. Corp. Counsel, Nov. 2004, 
at 56, 70 (summarizing several empirical studies comparing litigation 
with arbitration); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration 
and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, Disp. 
resol. J., Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 44, 48 & tbl.1; Elizabeth Hill, Due 
Process at a Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitra-
tion Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 
ohio st. J. on Disp. resol.777, 824 (2003); Lewis L. Maltby, Private 
Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 ColuM. huM. rts. 
l. rev. 29, 46 (1998); David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael 
Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for 
Empirical Research, 57 stan. l. rev. 1557, 1567–78, 1586–91 (2005) 
(reviewing prior empirical research and presenting the results of a 
case study finding arbitration faster and more efficient than litigation); 
Frederick L. Sullivan, Accepting Evolution in Workplace Justice: The 
Need for Congress to Mandate Arbitration, 26 W. neW eng. l. rev. 
281, 308–12 (2004).
3 David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 notre 
DaMe l. rev. 1247, 1262–63 (2009) (arguing empirical evidence tends 
to support that mandatory arbitration is unfair, as measured by aggre-
gate pro-plaintiff dispositions).
Cornell Labor and Employment Law Report • October 2013   5
there is insufficient information on which to base a decision 
on whether the process is fair.4
Union advocates apply the base rate argument to their 
contention that the current system of campaigns and elec-
tions is unfair. They often argue that the critical information 
about employees’ desires with regard to a union is known 
prior to the election. Their argument rests on the fact that 
although they need just 30 percent of employee signatures 
on union preference cards to petition for an election, they 
often have well over 60 percent of the employees signing the 
cards.5 With that level of support, one would expect unions 
to win most elections, but instead a union loses anywhere 
from 30 percent to 60 percent of elections each year.6 Given 
that outcome, labor contends that the election system is 
unfair. In this context we must note that the union win rate 
has been at the top of that range in recent years. Unions pre-
vailed in 67.6 percent of elections held in calendar year 2010 
and in 68.7 percent of elections held in calendar year 2009. 
However, those percentages are subject to another argu-
ment, because a large number of filed petitions do not result 
in elections. According to one study, of 22,382 organizing 
drives occurring between 1994 and 2004 that filed an elec-
tion petition, secret ballot elections were held in only 14,615 
(65%).7 Of those 14,615 elections, unions won 8,155, or 56 
percent.8 Thus, from the unions’ view, the percentage of suc-
cessful drives is relatively small.
Let’s look next at the disparity between the percentage 
of organizing signatures and the vote outcome, which is 
another element of the argument that the election process 
is unfair. There are several explanations for why a union 
can have a large percentage of cards signed but still lose the 
election. Some observers contend that many employees sign 
authorization cards due to peer pressure or simply because 
they respect the American ideal of the democratic process 
of voting for one’s representative. The cost to the employee 
of saying yes to having a vote is relatively low. Given these 
4 Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Descrip-
tive, Normative, and Methodological Challenges, 19 Behav. Brain sCi. 1 
(1996) (using an example of a coach on an Olympic basketball team try-
ing to decide between two players to make a final attempt at shooting the 
game-winning basket, to illustrate the authors’ point on base-rate fallacy).
5 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (2010); see An-
drew W. Martin, The Institutional Logic of Union Organizing and the Ef-
fectiveness of Social Movement Repertoires, 113 aM. J. soC. 1067, 1072 
(2008) (“[M]any unions will not file [for a certification election] until a 
majority of workers sign [authorization cards].”)
6 Martin, supra note 5, at 1089 tbl.7, 1096 fig.A-2.
7 John-Paul Ferguson, The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model of 
Union Organizing Drives, 1999-2004, 62 inDus. & laB. rel. rev. 1, 6 
(2009). 
8 Id.
arguments, employees could sign cards in favor of a vote 
even though they plan to vote against the union. The high 
percentage of signed cards might also be due to pressure, 
whether lawful or unlawful, exerted by union organizers 
on employees. Employees also might sign cards in response 
to the union’s unilateral attempt to organize the employees, 
during which employees hear only one side of the story 
regarding workplace issues. By the time of the election, in 
contrast, employees have heard both sides of the story and 
may make a more informed decision. While it is possible 
that employers intimidate and otherwise unfairly influence 
employees, as unions sometimes charge, the drop in union 
support could also be the result of the workers’ having more 
complete information at the time of the vote than they had 
when they signed the card. This often occurs in elections for 
public office, where a front-running candidate is unexpect-
edly defeated by a late entry who captures the electorate’s 
imagination. 
The outcome of union certification elections may also 
reflect changes in the way Americans view organized labor 
and collective rights and voice in the workplace. From the 
1940s through the 1970s, the height of the private sector 
union movement, pro-union messages abounded in popular 
culture. Just as examples, Woody Guthrie sang about join-
ing unions, textile workers had children singing “look for 
the union label,” and Sally Field won the Academy Award 
in 1979 for her role as an employee and union organizer, 
“Norma Rae.” Even “On the Waterfront,” a 1954 Academy 
Award-winning film that portrayed unions in less-than-
positive terms, concluded with employees getting their 
union back and running it on the “up-and-up.” Fairly or 
not, unions can now be viewed as entities that cost us the 
World Series in 1994 and a large piece of the NBA season 
in 2011–12, have put a hammerlock on educational reform, 
and are being blamed for driving states into near bank-
ruptcy. It’s noteworthy that politicians such as Wisconsin 
governor Scott Walker are willing to sign bills that directly 
target unions.9 Legislators in Michigan, long known as the 
strongest of union states approved a right-to-work law in 
2013, while New Hampshire has considered such legislation 
in both 2012 and 2013. Finally, a 2009 Gallup poll indicated 
a sharp decline in Americans’ approval of labor unions—48 
percent approved, down from 59 percent the year before,10 
and that figure recovered only to 52 percent in 2010 where it 
9 See Office of the Governor Scott Walker, Governor Walker Introduces 
Budget Repair Bill (February 18, 2011) available at http://www.wisgov.
state.wi.us/journal_media_detail.asp?locid=177&prid=5622.
10 Labor Unions See Sharp Slide in U.S. Public Support, gallup, (Sept. 
3, 2009) http://www.gallup.com/poll/122744/Labor-Unions-Sharp-Slide-
Public-Support.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).
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Ethical Principals for Employee Choice
Richard Bensinger and Dick Shubert developed the Institute for Employee Choice, grounded on two principles: (1) to do what is best for employees; 
and (2) to be governed by ethics—not law.
The Ethical Principles
These principles define ethical conduct for both unions and employers and are based on the premise that employees will make the decision about 
organizing through a contested secret ballot election.
Truthfulness. The Employer and the Union should be truthful and accurate in their campaigns. Although the law does not regulate honesty, the 
parties have the ethical obligation to present accurate information to employees. If either side contends that a statement by the other is not accurate 
and truthful, the Institute for Employee Choice, a joint labor-management entity, will provide an opinion.
No threats, implicit or explicit. Neither the Union nor the Employer should make threats, implicit or explicit, in order to gain votes. A free choice 
requires that there be no coercion or fear. Under current law, veiled threats are tolerated and there are no meaningful penalties for direct threats. An 
atmosphere of fear is antithetical to free expression of employee choice. 
No promises. Just as threats are not acceptable, neither are promises or bribes. Under the NLRA employers are prohibited to make promises but 
unions are allowed to make promises. Under these principles neither side is allowed to make promises to gain votes.
It is not fair to imply that the exception is the rule. A common way of distorting the truth is by presenting an unusual situation, and implying 
that this is the norm. The parties must not use extreme examples to sway opinion. And also should tell the whole story.
Corporate campaigns. If employers agree to these principles, then unions should not undertake “corporate campaign” strategies that are designed 
to pressure the employer. These principles presume that both parties reach out to employees to present their case. Corporate campaigns are only 
ethical when there is an uneven playing field such that employee free choice is not meaningfully present.
Discharges. There should be no discharges, subcontracting of work, or layoffs aimed at discouraging union activity. This is the ultimate coercion, 
and immediately chills any possible free choice. Employers who terminate a known union supporter or member of the union’s organizing committee 
should submit the termination to immediate arbitration. Penalties for discharging a union supporter should include quadruple back pay as well as 
punitive damages to discourage such conduct. The reason that multiple back pay and reinstatement is not a sufficient deterrent is because this 
behavior has such a drastic chilling effect on the rest of the workforce. Punitive damages as appropriate are essential to deter such conduct.
Equal time, equal access, equal posting rights, and all meetings are voluntary. The union must have equal access to the electorate including 
equal time for all meetings conducted as part of the employer’s campaign. A series of debates between management and the union is encouraged. 
The employees should have a right to hear both sides, without any advantage to either side. There should be no one-on-one meetings about the 
union between supervisors and employees. The union must be granted equal space to post literature on company property.
Delays. The employer should agree not to engage in delaying tactics. Parties cannot ethically rely on lengthy legal maneuvers to thwart freedom of 
choice.
No pressure to sign union cards. The union should not pressure employees to sign cards. Peer pressure or coercion to get people to sign union 
cards is not ethical.
Respect. Neither party should demonize its adversary. An atmosphere of mutual respect is necessary for an ethical climate. Unions have an important 
role in a democracy. Employers also are entitled to respect. Neither party should engage in smear tactics.
Stacking the deck. Neither party should attempt to “stack the deck.” If employers accept these principles, then the union may not ethically plant 
undercover union-supporters (salts) into the workplace. Neither can employers seek to hire anti-union personnel in order to gain votes. 
The Golden Rule. The final principle is not a specific ethical guideline, but the Golden Rule—do unto others as you would have them do to unto 
you. Both employers and unions have an important role to play in a vibrant democracy, and ethical behavior is an end in itself. The Institute for 
Employee Choice is available to support and commend employers and unions who agree to adhere to these principles.1
1 The Principles are available by contacting Richard Bensinger, bensinger2@aol.com 
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NLRB Rules for Organizing and Secret Ballot 
Elections
The National Labor Relations Act sets forth the laws regulat-
ing this form of employee organization.16 Under those rules, 
before any labor organization can be certified as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative for any group of employees, 
the employees in that group, called a bargaining unit, vote 
for or against union representation in a secret-ballot election 
monitored by the National Labor Relations Board.17 In most 
cases, the NLRB seeks to schedule such an election approxi-
mately three to six weeks after the union initiates the process 
by filing a representation petition.18 This time period may 
be extended if the employer contests the bargaining unit or 
if other issues arise. In a study of 22,382 organizing drives 
from 1999 through 2004, the average case that went to elec-
tion did so in 41 days, and 95 percent of elections were held 
within 75 days of filing.19 It is during this time period, often 
referred to quite appropriately as the “campaign period,” that 
employers and unions compete to try to persuade the em-
ployees to vote their way. The length of the campaign is an 
issue in this discussion because studies have shown that de-
laying the vote—even by a single day—helps management.20 
Unionists argue that an extended campaign period translates 
into more opportunities for management to threaten, intimi-
date, and coerce employees into voting against the union. 
However, other observers suggest that a lengthy campaign 
period translates into a greater likelihood that employees 
will render informed decisions on voting day. 
We alluded to the 30-percent rule above and also men-
tioned a 60-percent threshold. Here’s why. Under the NLRB 
States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that an employer 
could not terminate a “salter” simply because the reason the employee 
joined the company was to organize it. See NLRB v. Town & Country 
Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 98 (1995).
16 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006).
17 § 159(e)(1).
18 See Customer Service Standards: Representation Cases, nat’l laBor 
relations BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/public_notices/customer_
service_standards/representation_cases.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2011). 
In 2010, the median time period between filing the petition and the initial 
election was thirty-eight days, and 95.1% of all initial elections occurred 
within fifty-six days of the filing. Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, 
Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd. to Employees of the Off. of the Gen. 
Counsel, Memorandum GC 11-03, at 5 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at 
http://nlrb.gov/publications/general-counsel-memos (select “2011” from 
the “Year” drop-down menu, click the “Apply” button, and click “View” 
under “GC 11-03”).
19 Ferguson, supra note 7, at 10 n.9.
20 See generally Myron Roomkin & Richard N. Block, Case Process-
ing Time and the Outcome of Representation Elections: Some Empirical 
Evidence, 1981 u. ill. l. rev. 75 (1981) (presenting a model of election 
outcomes that included delay as a significant predictor); Ferguson, supra 
note 7, at 14 (noting the negative impact of delay on union election win 
rates).
remained in 2011 and 2012.11 For comparison, in 1957, the 
approval rating was 75 percent.12
With all of these many uncontrollable factors, we 
contend that election results simply do not provide evidence 
of whether the system itself is fair. Accordingly, it is time to 
change the paradigm on how we judge fairness.
In this report, we propose a set of guiding principles 
for what we believe would be a fair system for determin-
ing whether a union would represent a group of workers. A 
fair system will result in employees believing that they had 
enough information to make an informed decision, that 
they were respected during the election process, and that 
they were not intimidated, threatened, or coerced. Such a 
system would be fair regardless of whether the union won 
or lost. Fortunately, we did not have to devise such a system 
or its operating principles, because we found this approach 
in Principles for Ethical Conduct During Union Representa-
tional Campaigns, developed by the Institute for Employee 
Choice, a project of Richard Bensinger and Dick Shubert, as 
described in the sidebar on the previous page. 
Let’s use the Principles for Ethical Conduct as a crucible 
for examining the current system and proposed system to 
see whether each is fair and gives employees due respect and 
information during the election process. Holding fairness 
aside, we also analyze these systems to see whether they 
would in fact remedy the problems they are intended to 
resolve and would produce the desired results.
The Traditional System for Union Organizing
The current union organizing process may begin when dis-
satisfied employees seek out a union,13 when unions initiate 
discussions with employees, or when organizers enter an 
employer’s property and start handing out authorization 
cards or setting up picket lines.14 Unions may use current 
employees to “sell” the union to co-workers, or sometimes 
they send their members to apply for jobs with non-union 
employers the unions wish to organize.15 
11 U.S. Approval of Labor Unions Remains Near Record Low, gallup, 
(Aug. 12, 2010) http://www.gallup.com/poll/142007/Americans-Approv-
al-Labor-Unions-Remains-Near-Record-Low.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 
2011).
12 Id.
13 Employees often seek out unions because of perceived failures in one 
or more of five key areas: lack of recognition, weak management, poor 
communication, substandard working conditions, and non-competitive 
wages and benefits. See Martin Jay levitt, Confessions of a union 
Buster 49 (1993).
14 See, e.g., Johnson & Hardin Co. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 237, 240–42 (6th 
Cir. 1995) (affirming a Board order finding an employer unlawfully inter-
fered with its employees’ Section 7 rights where the employer excluded 
union representatives from distributing union literature on state-owned 
property outside the employer’s place of business).
15 The applicants’ reason for applying is to organize the real employees. 
This method, referred to as “salting,” has been the subject of a United 
8 Cornell Institute for Hospitality Labor and Employment Relations • Cornell University
Under the law, employers may, however, engage in 
numerous campaign activities to convince employees to vote 
against the union. During the campaign period, employers 
provide employees with the management perspective of em-
ployees’ rights and the consequences of voting in favor of the 
union.28 To get their message across, employers can and will 
require all employees to attend so-called “captive audience” 
speeches,29 send letters home,30 and spend significant time 
and money on communicating their message, often employ-
ing law firms and consulting firms that specialize in crafting 
anti-union campaign strategies. Management cannot offer 
employees any benefit for attending a meeting,31 but they 
may mandate attendance.32 
Unions, on the other hand, may not hold captive audi-
ence speeches33 and, in fact, have no right to come onto an 
employer’s property.34 Unions are, however, entitled to a list 
28 As long as informing employees of the consequences does not rise to 
the level of a threat. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006). Employers typically raise 
some or all of the following issues, based in part on advice from counsel 
and from their unique circumstances, industry and employee demograph-
ics: Whether unions may “guarantee” increased pay, benefits, or anything 
else; how collective bargaining really works; what happens when strikes 
are called or picketing is conducted; what it costs to be a union member 
in terms of dues and initiation fees; where that money goes; how it is used, 
and by whom; whether the union’s leaders are trustworthy and capable; 
the employer’s record of responsiveness to employee issues; the fact that 
employees will be paying someone to do what they may have been able to 
do (represent themselves) for free; whether the organizing drive has actu-
ally been beneficial in the sense that it has called attention to problems that 
need to be addressed whether the union is there or not; and whether the 
employer should make management changes (because an organizing drive 
seems to have been triggered by a perceived lack of leadership).
29 See: Kate Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital 
Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union Organizing, res. stuD. & rep. 73 
tbl.8 (2000), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?art
icle=1002&context=reports (finding that, of 400 union campaigns studied, 
92% included captive-audience speeches).
30 However, in-person visits by management to employees’ homes are per 
se prohibited. See In re General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). 
The union, on the contrary, may make home visits, as long as those visits 
are not threatening or coercive. Cf. Simo v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. 
& Textile Employees, Sw. Dist. Council, 322 F.3d 602, 620–21 (9th Cir. 
2003).
31 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
32 Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 406 (1953); see also Est-
lund, supra note, at 1536–37.
33 NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958) (stat-
ing, of captive-audience speeches, that unions are not “entitled to use a 
medium of communication simply because the employer is using it”); 
Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. at 406.
34 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 535 (1992); see also Republic 
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 342 U.S. 793, 803 & n.10 (1945) (finding no-
solicitation rules presumptively valid); cf. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox 
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1955) (creating an exception to the rule that an 
employer may bar nonemployee union members from the employer’s 
property when the location of the employees’ workplace and homes 
make reasonable nontrespassatory efforts ineffective); In re Dillon Cos., 
340 N.L.R.B. 1260, 1260 (2003) (finding a no-solicitation rule that was 
rules, a union may request the secret-ballot election only if 
a minimum of 30 percent of the employees in an appropri-
ate bargaining unit have signed authorization cards.21 As a 
practical matter, however, most national unions will not file 
a petition unless at least 60 percent of the employees have 
signed cards.22 To prevail in the election, the union needs a 
simple majority of the ballots cast, 23 while employers win 
in the event of a tie.24 
Campaign Issues
The current rules specify employers’ permitted activities 
during the campaign period. Employers may not threaten, 
interrogate, make promises to, or engage in surveillance of 
employees,25 for example, nor may they solicit grievances 
or confer benefits.26 If the employer violates these rules, the 
NLRB may either order the election to be rerun or issue a 
bargaining order.27 
21 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (2010).
22 Telephone Interview with Richard W. Hurd, Professor of Indus. & 
Lab. Rel., Cornell Univ. Sch. of Indus. & Lab. Rel. (June 28, 2001); accord 
Martin, supra note 5, at 1072 (“[M]any unions will not file [for a certifica-
tion election] until a majority of workers sign [authorization cards].”); 
Jack Fiorito, Union Organizing in the United States, in Union Organiz-
ing: Campaigning for Trade Union Recognition 200 (Gregor Gall, 
ed. 2003). Frankly, this is a conservative estimate based on conversations 
the authors have had with union officials over the past seven years. Some 
assert that the percentage of employees the union considers supporters 
(based on authorization card signatures) is between 75 and 90 percent.
23 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), as interpreted in: Marlin-Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 
116 F.2d 586, 588 (2d Cir. 1941).
24 C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 880, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
25See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(c); NLRB v. St. Francis Healthcare Ctr., 212 
F.3d 945, 962 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding the employer unlawfully interfered 
with representation election by threatening to close the facility if the 
union were elected); Tamper, Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 907, 938 (1973) (finding 
an unfair labor practice where the employer coercively interrogated its 
employees about their union sympathies); E.g., NLRB v. Wis-Pak Foods, 
Inc., 125 F.3d 518, 522–23 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that a promise to 
increase wages constituted an unlawful promise of benefit); General Elec. 
Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 627, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding a promise of a 
postelection gift constituted an unlawful promise of benefit); and Cal. 
Acrylic Indus., Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 41, 63 (1996) (finding the employer 
violated the Act where it videotaped meetings between employees and 
union representatives).
26 NLRB v. V & S Schuler Eng’g, Inc., 309 F.3d 362, 370–71 (6th Cir. 
2002) (finding the employer violated the Act by soliciting grievances 
when he had not done so before, creating a “compelling inference that 
he is implicitly promising to correct those inequities . . . mak[ing] union 
representation unnecessary”); and Wis-Pak, 125 F.3d at 522, 524–25 
(finding that favorable changes to the overtime and attendance policies 
constituted an unlawful grant of benefits).
27 A bargaining order is an NLRB mandate requiring a company to 
“cease and desist from their unfair labor practices, to offer reinstatement 
and back pay to the employees who had been discriminatorily discharged, 
to bargain with the union on request, and to post the appropriate notices.” 
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 585 (1969). 
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of the eligible employees,35 and, unlike employers, unions 
may make promises, interrogate, solicit grievances, and 
confer benefits, including buying employees pizza and beer. 
Both sides may lie to employees, but neither may provide the 
employees with forgeries intended to deceive.36
Employers and unions disagree about whether the play-
ing field is level. For their part, employers argue that unions’ 
ability to socially interact with employees gives unions at 
worst a level playing field and at best a significant advantage. 
In contrast, union advocates contend that the reason for 
labor’s failure to organize, and the consequential drop in 
union density is that the rules of organizing unfairly favor 
employers, because they intimidate employees and either: 
(1) violate the law with impunity because there is no real 
enforcement or (2) act within the law because objectionable 
and effective conduct is not unlawful (although it should be). 
Indeed, union advocates claim that during most campaigns 
employers illegally threaten, intimidate, and terminate 
employees who favor the union. According to a 2005 report 
by the Center for Urban Economic Development at the 
University of Illinois at Chicago, when faced with organiz-
ing drives, 30 percent of employers fire pro-union workers, 
49 percent threaten to close a worksite if the union prevails, 
and 51 percent coerce workers into opposing unions with 
bribery or favoritism.37 Unions further point to the numer-
ous unfair labor practice charges filed against employers and 
to evidence suggesting a connection between meritorious 
unfair labor practice charges filed and a lower likelihood of 
union election victories,38 as well as offering anecdotal evi-
previously unenforced but resurrected at the beginning of the union’s 
campaign was unlawful); Supervalu Holdings, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 425, 
425 (2006) (finding a no-solicitation rule invalid because it was enforced 
discriminatorily against union activity).
35 NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 767 (1969) (affirm-
ing the Excelsior rule); Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 
1239–40 (1966) (establishing the disclosure requirement).
36 Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982) (“[W]
e will no longer probe into the truth or falsity of the parties’ campaign 
statements, and . . . we will not set elections aside on the basis of mis-
leading campaign statements. We will, however, intervene in cases where 
a party has used forged documents which render the voters unable to 
recognize propaganda for what it is.”); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co., 266 
N.L.R.B. 507, 507–08 (1983).
37 Chirag Mehta & Nik Theodore, Undermining the Right to Organize: 
Employer Behavior During Union Representation Campaigns, at 5, 9, Am. 
Rts. at Work, (Dec. 2005) http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dm-
documents/ARAWReports/UROCUEDcompressedfullreport.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2011); accord Bronfenbrenner, supra note 35, at 73 tbl.8 
(reporting similarly staggering statistics, including that, of employers 
in 400 union campaigns, 34% used bribes or special favors, 48% made 
unlawful promises of improvement, and 25% discharged union activists); 
Kate Bronfenbrenner et al., Introduction, in Organizing to Win 1, 4–5 
(Kate Bronfenbrenner et al., eds. 1998).
38 See Ferguson, supra, note 7, at 15 (finding that meritorious unfair 
labor practice charges filed by unions against employers had a statistically 
dence of outrageous employer behavior. In view of all those 
factors, unions contend that the system is unfair because 
they lose numerous elections. 
Looking at that same outcome, employers and some 
scholars argue that unions lose elections because they have 
nothing left to sell to employees.39 This perception is based 
on two arguments: (1) traditional labor–management rela-
tions simply do not serve employees’ interests;40 and (2) 
unions’ ability to sell anything is diminished by a decline in 
the perceived trustworthiness to carry through on promises 
made. Others cite internal union weaknesses as a cause of 
failed organizing.41 This argument suggests that organized 
labor has failed to adapt with the times, and that unions 
have not connected to a new generation of workers who 
have a different view of the workplace than their elders. Oth-
er observers have argued that collective employment rights 
have been eclipsed by the staggering enactment of legislation 
protecting individual employee rights.42 Shifts in the U.S. 
economy are also cited for the drop in union organizing. An 
“enterprise based” system of industrial relations in private 
industry has meant that unions negotiate with single firms 
significant impact on the likelihood of unions winning elections, reducing 
the success rate by 52%). 
39 According to management side labor lawyers, one of the key strategies 
in this regard is to examine what the union is selling and explain to the 
employees that the costs outweigh the benefits. One problem for the 
unions, according to some, is that organized labor does not always have 
much to sell. For example, one lawyer discussed a union organizing drive 
in which the union represented to employees that it would demand that 
the employer implement the union’s health insurance plan if it were elect-
ed. The union extolled the fact that it would insist that the employer pay 
100% of the cost of the plan, as opposed to their current plan under which 
the employees paid a portion of the cost. The employer held a meeting in 
which it compared the two plans side-by-side. While the union plan did 
not feature any up-front costs, the coverage was clearly so inferior that the 
employees concluded that they were better off with the employer plan and 
voted against the union. Employers contend that this insurance issue is a 
typical example of the current state of union organizing: at first the union 
pitch sounds great, but after close examination the employees do not want 
to buy what the union is selling. Employers argue that this is one reason 
why companies are able to defeat unions in elections.
40 Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Workers Want 56 (1999) 
(finding a desire among employees for an organization run “jointly” by 
both labor and management).
41 Bronfenbrenner suggested unions focused too little effort on recruit-
ment during the 70s and 80s and failed to adapt their organizing strategies 
to new challenges. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 43, at 5–6. Getman agrees 
that unions’ failure to adapt their thinking contributed to the demise, and 
points to other internal weaknesses: internal politics, inability to coordi-
nate with other locals, corruption, and a divide between leadership and 
rank-and-file emlpoyees. Getman, supra note at 584–93.
42 Michael J. Piore & Sean Safford, Changing Regimes of Workplace 
Governance, Shifting Axes of Social Mobilization, and the Challenge to 
Industrial Relations Theory, 45 inD. rel. 299-325 (2006).
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instead of corporations or industries,43 thereby precluding 
industrial democracy and industrial stability as it formerly 
existed.44 Still others mark the advent of enlightened human 
resources policies as explaining labor’s inability to orga-
nize.45 Management often contends that simply informing 
employees of the “truth” will allow them to prevail,46 and 
further that the system is fair because the lack of union 
density reflects the will of the people. Unionists argue that 
the statistics (i.e., the outcomes) prove that the system is 
unfair,47 but we contend that the system is unfair because of 
the process, rather than the outcomes.48
As we have described here, the current system has dif-
ferent sets of rules for unions and management. Some rules 
do apply to both sides, including being able to lie to the 
employees, trash the other side, and pressure the employees 
to vote one way or the other.49 Employers’ rules give them 
the advantage of access to employees, particularly at captive 
audience meetings, as well as via impromptu conversa-
43 Ronald W. Schatz, From Commons to Dunlop: Rethinking the Field 
and Theory of Industrial Relations, in inDustrial DeMoCraCy in aMeriCa: 
the aMBiguous proMise, nelson liChtenstein & hoWell John harris, 
eds. 88 (1993).
44 Id.
45 Jack Fiorito & Cheryl L. Maranto, The Contemporary Decline of Union 
Strength, 5 ConteMp. pol’y issues 12, 16–17 (1987).
46 Surveys of union organizers and employees who have been through 
NLRB election campaigns seem to confirm this trend at least indirectly. 
See, e.g., Workers Weigh in on Alleged Coercion During Card Check Cam-
paign and NLRB Elections, Am. Rts. at Work (Mar. 21, 2006) http://www.
americanrightsatwork.org/press-center/2006-press-releases/workers-
weigh-in-on-alleged-coercion-during-card-check-campaigns-and-nlrb-
elections-20060320-239-345-345.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
47 There are those that go beyond the statistics and make a normative 
assessment of the NLRA, arguing that it is biased in favor of employers. 
However, these analyses tend to omit or undervalue the advantages the 
Act accords unions and emphasize the advantages accorded employers. 
See, e.g., Getman, supra at 578–84.
48 Others, a rare minority by our account of the current state of this 
relevant scholarship, such as John-Paul Ferguson (supra note 7) and Chris 
Riddell (Union Certification Success under Voting versus Card-Check 
Procedures: Evidence from British Columbia, 1978-1998, 57 inDus. & 
laB. rel. rev. 4, 493 (2004)), have suggested that systemic accountability 
potentially accounts for a greater percentage of variation in win-rates and 
union density than the other factors described above.
49 Note well that all of this can be done without engaging in, for example, 
threats, interrogation, or recording campaign activity—tactics that neither 
management nor the union can employ. E.g., Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 
292 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1074 (1989) (setting aside an election where a union 
agent photographed employees engaging in anti-union campaigning and 
said “we know who you guys are…after the union wins the election some 
of you may not be here”); cf. Deffenbaugh Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 122 F.3d 
582, 587 (8th Cir. 1997) (refusing to set aside an election on the basis of a 
rumor that the union would call the INS if it did not win in the absence 
of direct threats); NLRB v. O’Daniel Trucking Co., 23 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 
1994) (refusing to set aside an election on the basis of an employee’s claim 
that a business agent was “leaning on” him).
tions in the workplace. Unions, on the other hand, have the 
advantage of being able to make promises, visit employees’ 
homes, and party with the employees. Employers have the 
inherent power advantage, while unions often have a head 
start in the race to the election. At the end of this process, 
the employees likely have little, if any, ability to gauge the 
accuracy of the information received from either side; they 
often fear reprisals for voting for one side or the other; and 
they likely feel like pawns whose desires are subordinated 
to those of two large entities. Management will swear that 
it has learned a lesson from the experience and will vow to 
change. For its part, the union will swear that no change 
which management may implement will remain intact with-
out the perpetual threat of organization and that permanent 
progress is only attainable by certifying the union as the 
employees’ representative.50
Card-Check Neutrality Agreements and the 
Employee Free Choice Act
We are among those who are not enthusiastic about the cur-
rent system, but it is important to note that it does at least 
result in a secret ballot election. One proposal to reform 
this broken, outdated means of selecting workplace labor 
organization representation is card-check neutrality. The 
Employee Free Choice Act carried a card-check provision, 
albeit without employer neutrality.51 In our view, the EFCA 
would have attenuated perhaps the most critical component 
of the process’s fairness—employees’ right to freely choose 
their representative or to choose not to be represented at all. 
In the following section, we’ll describe card-check neutrality 
agreements and assess whether they would result in a fair 
system under the principles we have adopted.
Although neutrality agreements come in several forms, 
the common denominator for all of them is that employers 
agree to remain neutral with regard to the union’s attempt to 
organize the workforce.52 Neutrality agreements commonly 
give the union access to employees in the form of a list of 
their names and addresses (and, sometimes, telephone num-
bers), as well as permission to come onto company property 
50 levitt, supra note 15.
51 Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).
52 While most agreements contain a definition of neutrality, the defini-
tions vary widely. Most Communication Workers of America, United 
Auto Workers, and USWA agreements define neutrality as “neither 
helping nor hindering” the union’s organizing effort, yet still allow 
employers to communicate facts to the employees. See Adrienne E. Eaton 
& Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card Check 
Agreements, 55 inDus. & laB. rel. rev. 42, 48–49 (2001). A differ-
ent approach is apparent from the HERE agreements (from before the 
UNITE–HERE merger) that prohibit the employer from communicat-
ing any opposition to the union. Id. Less typical definitions declare that 
management will make an affirmative statement to their employees that it 
welcomes their choice of a representative. Id. 
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during work hours for the purpose of collecting authoriza-
tion cards. This provision negates one employer advantage, 
since the employer currently has no obligation to provide 
and may actually be prohibited from providing the union 
with such sweeping access to its employees.53 
The card-check provisions found in most neutrality 
agreements require the employer to recognize the union if a 
majority of the bargaining unit employees sign authorization 
cards.54 Thus, card-check agreements obviate any secret-
ballot election, as we mentioned above. 
What Effect Do Neutrality Agreements Have on 
Unionization?
Neutrality agreements radically change the landscape of 
union organizing. One study found that unions prevailed in 
78 percent of the situations in which neutrality agreements 
had been signed, compared to a 46-percent success rate in 
contested elections.55 We’re certain that this study under-
states the effect of the neutrality agreement if only because 
the sampled populations for the two figures are different. 
The figure for elections includes only organizing attempts 
where the union has 50 to 60 percent of signed employee 
cards.56 Thus, the 46-percent figure excludes situations 
where the union could not get at least 51 percent of the 
employees to sign cards and did not have an election. On 
the other hand, the neutrality figure includes employers who 
signed such agreements, although the chances that all those 
workplaces would become organized with an election is far 
less than that in the case of a neutrality agreement. Those 
employers whose employees had no interest represent the 
22 percent of companies that remained non-union. In other 
words it is likely that 100 percent of the companies that went 
to election would have been unionized under a neutral-
ity with card-check, and that 22 percent of those under 
card-check agreements would never have gone to election. 
Assuming there is enough employee interest to warrant an 
election in the first place, the company’s chances of becom-
ing unionized were less than 50 percent under the NLRB’s 
election procedures and nearly guaranteed under a neutral-
ity agreement with a card-check provision.
Are Neutrality Agreements Fair? 
Under our definition of fairness, card-check neutrality fails. 
A system where the parties hear only one side of the story, 
53 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 534 (1992); 
54 Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 60, at 47 tbl.1 (finding seventy-three per-
cent of neutrality agreements studied had card-check language).
55 Id. at 52 & tbl.3; see also Chris Riddell, supra note 55 (finding a 
union success rate difference of approximately 19% in British Columbia 
attributable to card-check procedures as compared to mandatory voting 
procedures).
56 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
have access to only one union, don’t get to vote in a secret 
ballot election, and are therefore susceptible to union intimi-
dation is, to us, the antithesis of fairness. In a conference at 
Indiana University, we heard one scholar suggest that unions 
would never intimidate employees to sign cards. The scholar, 
however, could not dispute the following logic: union 
organizers working under a card check are successful only if 
they get the employees to sign cards. Successful organizers 
are promoted. Unsuccessful organizers are not promoted 
and are pushed out of the organization. Sometimes one card 
is the difference between success and failure. Thus, how can 
anyone contend that an organizer faced with success or fail-
ure will not do anything necessary to be successful? 
Quick Elections
Let’s return to the NLRB’s potential rule change that would 
mandate quick elections, again on the grounds of fairness. 
While analyzing the entire proposed rules is beyond the 
scope of this paper, NLRB board member Hayes asserted 
that the new rules will result in elections in 10 to 21 days 
after the cards are signed.57 Labor argues that a shortened 
time period would allow a secret ballot election, but would 
curtail management’s ability to threaten, intimidate, coerce, 
promise benefits to, and observe employees. 
This proposed election scheme fails the fairness test and, 
in fact, may hurt the efforts of both sides. It’s hard to argue 
that a 10- to 21-day campaign period would allow manage-
ment sufficient time to convey its side of the story. Moreover, 
the expedited process may provoke more lawsuits, which 
would hurt both sides. Before holding a union election, one 
of the most difficult issues to resolve is the proper scope of 
the bargaining unit. Those advocating for quick elections 
argue that a “vote now and litigate later” approach will 
sufficiently address these issues. In the current approach, 
management decides whether to contest the bargaining unit 
before the election. As a practical matter, employers often 
consent to the proposed unit to avoid the expense of chal-
lenging the proposal, the risk of losing the challenge, and 
the potential of appearing obstructionist to employees. In 
contrast, if “vote now and litigate later” were the norm, man-
agement would have every incentive to litigate should it lose 
the election. Such litigation would almost certainly delay the 
union’s certification for months or even years. 
57 See 155 Cong. reC. S3, 636 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Arlen Specter) (proposing a quick-election scheme where the initial elec-
tion would be held within twenty-one days of the filing of the petition); 
Implications of the Employee Free Choice Act, Metro. Corp. Counsel, 
Sept. 2009, at 12, 12. See also, the dissent of Member Hayes to the NLRB’s 
proposed Rule making at: http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/525/dissent.pdf 
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Developing a New System for Union Organizing
As we have stated throughout this report, we contend that 
a fair system would be one in which employees have the 
opportunity to obtain full information from both the union 
and management. At the end of the process, employees 
should feel that they were treated with respect and not 
threatened or intimidated by either side. The procedures in 
the current process, including card-check neutrality agree-
ments, card-checks without neutrality, and quick elections, 
all fail to meet that fairness standard. Also of questionable 
fairness is the current NLRB rules that allow both sides to 
behave in questionable fashion and encourage both sides use 
all possible weapons defeat each other. 
To develop a system for electing labor organizations 
that is focused on what is best for the voting employees, we 
sought a system that would operationalize our core beliefs, 
which are summarized as follows: (1) unionization will 
benefit some employees, but will not benefit others; (2) 
some employees want a union and others do not; (3) policy 
should be driven by employee choice, not by achieving labor 
peace regardless of the cost; (4) employees should have 
full information, or at least the maximum opportunity for 
exposure to full information; (5) employees should vote in 
a secret ballot election; (6) management and unions have 
corrupted the current NLRA rules so that the goal is to 
win and not to facilitate employee choice; and (7) a union 
organizing system will be successful if, regardless of the 
result, at its conclusion, the employees feel they have been 
respected, fully informed, not intimidated, and are satisfied 
that they made the choice they wanted to make. Given that 
framework, we encourage unions and management to adopt 
the Principles for Ethical Conduct which we are introducing 
in this report. 
The principals of the Institute for Employee Choice, 
Richard Bensinger and Dick Shubert, both have considerable 
labor experience. Bensinger is a long-time union organizer 
whose résumé includes being the first head of organizing 
for the AFL-CIO, as well as working with unite/here, the 
United Auto Workers, and other unions. Shubert is the for-
mer president of Bethlehem Steel and was Deputy Secretary 
of Labor in the Nixon and Ford administrations. The two 
men grew frustrated by the current system and its perverse 
incentives for both unions and management. Despite com-
ing from opposite sides of a polarized issue, Bensinger and 
Shubert shared the core beliefs listed above. They developed 
the ethical principals that we presented in the sidebar on 
page 8, based on their experiences and their beliefs.
The substance of the principles appeal to us for a num-
ber of reasons. The obvious reasons are that they provide 
for elections, full information, and truthfulness, and they 
prohibit coercion and intimidation. More important, they 
address implicit threats from management that fly under the 
NLRB’s radar.58 Perhaps most salient is that the principles 
establish a single set of rules for both sides. Employees will 
get equal access to both sides and neither side will be able 
to exploit differential rules to gain an advantage. Instead 
of employers using captive audience speeches and unions 
buying pizza and beer, both sides can have captive audience 
speeches and neither side can buy pizza or beer. While em-
ployers may bristle at inviting the union onto the premises, 
the elimination of corporate campaigns, which are driven 
by union intimidation and management’s fear of the loss of 
business, should make an acceptable trade. 
In addition to satisfying our goals, the principles are 
attractive because they may soon be operationalized. While 
the institute has overseen only one election, the United Auto 
Workers in 2011 announced a plan to operate under these 
principles for all new elections.59 The UAW’s 2012 nego-
tiations with the major multinational car manufacturers 
included provisions to make the principles the method for 
all future elections.60 
Anecdotal evidence from the one past election found 
that the employees who voted did, in fact, believe that they 
had full information to make a choice free from intimida-
tion.61 The fact that these principles may be used allows 
us to make a call for future research. We propose a com-
missioned study where researchers survey employees who 
have gone through organizing under the NLRA procedures, 
neutrality, and the fairness principles to determine whether 
any system truly satisfies the goals outlined above. 
Even with implementation of the fairness principles, 
some issues still need to be addressed. The principles pro-
hibit supervisor–employee one-on-one conversations, but 
do not address the same practice by union organizers. To be 
even-handed we would allow such supervisor conversations, 
as long as they otherwise complied with the principles. We 
would also allow union organizers to have similar conversa-
58 For an example of veiled threats, compare what an employer cannot 
lawfully tell its employees with what employers may lawfully tell employ-
ees. Management cannot say, “If you vote for the union there will eventu-
ally be a strike, and there will be no wages, no health insurance, and strik-
ers can lose their jobs when the strike is over,” But management can couch 
a similar message as follows: “We will bargain in good faith, but will not 
agree to unreasonable union demands. If the union does not accept our 
offer its only choice will be to call a strike. The company hopes this does 
not happen, but if it does, there will be no wages, no health insurance, and 
strikers can lose their jobs when the strike is over. We hope this does not 
happen, but it’s a real concern if you vote for the union.”
59 See Answering UAW’s Call: Doing the Right Thing, uniteD auto 
Workers http://www.uaw.org/story/answering-uaw%E2%80%99s-call 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
60 Paul Ingrassia, The United Auto Workers Test Drive a New Model, Wall 
Street Journal, Feb 7, 2011.
61 Telephone interview with Richard Bensinger, Co-chair, Instit. For Emp. 
Choice (Feb. 7, 2011).
Cornell Labor and Employment Law Report • October 2013   13
tions on an employer’s property. After the petition is filed, 
we would prohibit off-site campaigning by either side.
While the exact nature of the principles could be 
amended depending on the situation, the most difficult 
issue is one of enforcement. We suggest that the parties 
agree upon a mediator to resolve issues if either side alleges 
a violation of the principles before the election is held. In 
this case, the mediator would first attempt to mediate this 
dispute. If mediation fails, the mediator would be empow-
ered to conduct an arbitration hearing, taking testimony and 
evidence in the traditional manner. The mediator-arbitrator 
then may determine whether the alleged offense violates 
the parties’ agreement and (if so) what remedy to fashion. If 
the offense by management is so egregious that it poisons 
the chances of conducting a fair election, the arbitrator may 
issue a bargaining order. The bar for such an order should be 
significantly lower than it is under current board law. That 
is, the penalty associated with highly egregious violations of 
the principles should be high. Similarly, if the offense by the 
union is so egregious that it poisons the chances of conduct-
ing a fair election, the arbitrator may rule that no election 
is to be held and that the union is barred from attempting 
to organize the employees for up to three years. For non-
egregious violations of the principles by management or 
the union, or in the event that employees (not privy to the 
agreement itself) are found to have done something that 
violates the terms of the agreement, the arbitrator is empow-
ered to fashion awards as she deems necessary to facilitate 
a fair election procedure. This may include, but is certainly 
not limited to, requiring management and the union to 
issue joint statements, or requiring one or the other to issue 
unilateral statements that ameliorate any tainting effects of 
conduct found to violate the principles.
After elections are held, the results will be not be 
released or publicized in any way for six days. Employers 
and unions may use this time to determine whether any 
violations of the principles occurred and to bring a claim to 
the mediator. If no claims are lodged during this time, the 
results of the election will be released and both sides will 
have by default waived their rights to allege any violations of 
the principles or to challenge any of the votes for any reason 
other than issues relating to interpreting intentions of voters 
from their ballots. If charges are filed during the six-day pe-
riod, the mediator shall mediate the dispute, and failing suc-
cessful mediation, arbitrate in the same manner as described 
above. Again, the mediator-arbitrator shall be empowered to 
issue any manner of award, including issuing a bargaining 
order for egregious employer violations, or an election bar 
for up to three years for egregious union violations.
A mediation-arbitration system like this one is likely to 
work best because it offers informality and flexibility, two 
important qualities of a dispute resolution system for resolv-
ing claims arising out of a morally valenced contract.62 More 
control over the process should beget more control over the 
resolution of disputes and should result in more creative 
integrative solutions than an adjudicatory process by itself.63 
The opportunity for greater ownership over the dispute-
resolution process and the ability to exert more influence 
over the outcomes of disputes should also be held out as a 
significant incentive for agreeing to the principles.
Employers reading this article might wonder why they 
should agree to a process using the principles. We give two 
reasons. First, we expect that employees would perceive 
the election procedure under the principles as being more 
fair. Increased perceived procedural fairness would likely 
lead to greater acceptance of the final outcome, and hence 
less industrial strife.64 Second, and probably of more value 
to employers, the principles are the best defense to union 
demands of card-check neutrality and corporate campaigns. 
The union mantra is: employers who refuse to give card-
check neutrality are mistreating employees and refusing to 
allow them workplace dignity. The principles provide true 
dignity by allowing for full information and a secret ballot 
election without all of the alleged negatives allowed un-
der the NLRA. We believe that progressive employers will 
prevail in a fair election and thus, such employers can take 
the highest road and achieve the desired result by using the 
principles. n
62 Roy Lewicki & Blair Sheppard, Choosing How to Intervene: Factors 
Affecting the Use of Process and Outcome Control in Third Party Dispute 
Resolution, 6 J. oCCupational Behav. 49 (1985); see also a. Douglas, in-
Dustrial peaCeMaking (1962); roBert Walton, interpersonal peaCeMak-
ing (1969); roBert Walton & roBert MCkersie, a Behavioral theory 
of laBor negotiations (1965); 
63 Corinne Bendersky, Organizational Dispute Resolution Systems: A 
Complementarities Model, 28 aCaD. Man. rev. 643 (2003).
64 E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Us-
ing Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 aDMin. sCi. Q. 224 
(1993).
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